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I.  Introduction 
As anyone with experience on either side of the human resources desk 
can attest, our social media footprints are following us to work.  Many 
employers now report checking applicants’ social media presence prior to 
hiring or even preliminary interviews, and popular-media advice on the 
recommended sanitization procedure is almost a daily feature of one news 
site or another.1  Some advice columns even caution that “reblogging”—the 
common practice of referring others in one’s online network to content 
published elsewhere—can cause controversial material to be associated 
with a job applicant, with corresponding positive or negative effects.2  
Employees and job applicants are well advised to note that employer-side 
attorneys are advising their clients of ways to justify terminations based on 
social media activity that might embarrass the company.3 
                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., Amy Levin-Epstein, Job Interview? Prep Your Facebook, Twitter 
Profile, CBS NEWS (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505125_162-
57561846/job-interview-prep-your-facebook-twitter-profile/ (recommending detailed clean-
up strategies, including leaving enough personal information to give an interesting personal 
impression). 
 2. See id. (“Just because you didn’t initially post it doesn’t mean it won’t be 
associated with your candidacy . . .”). 
 3. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. ROBBINS, ADVISING E-BUSINESSES Ch. 4, IX, § 4:69, 
Disciplining or Terminating Employees for Online Activities (2012) (characterizing social 
media websites as “a great way to obtain information about someone easily and at low cost,” 
acknowledging the “tempt[ation] to discipline an employee for her online remarks,” and 
offering general guidelines for crafting enforceable social media policies). 
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Increasingly, similar implications are affecting future professionals 
before they enter their chosen professions.4  Several recent cases have seen 
colleges and universities sanctioning students for their online communi-
cations, particularly via the still-dominant social media site Facebook, when 
the students’ postings were found to be incompatible with university rules.  
Notably, one particular, narrow group of students—those enrolled in 
undergraduate and graduate professional degree programs leading to 
government-regulated professions—have found themselves uniquely 
vulnerable to institutional discipline for their Facebook posts.5  As this Note 
demonstrates, courts have found that such students can face legitimate 
academic consequences for posts that demonstrate an alleged6 inability to 
abide by the associated profession’s code of conduct, even when such state-
sanctioned punishment would seem to offend the First Amendment.7 
Many prominent commentators have endorsed this emerging standard 
of limited student free speech at public institutions of higher learning.8  
                                                                                                     
 4. See Katherine C. Chretien, et al., Online Posting of Unprofessional Content by 
Medical Students, 302 JAMA 1309, 1309 (Sept. 23, 2009) (“Web 2.0 . . . risks broadcasting 
unprofessional content that can reflect poorly on individuals, affiliated institutions, and the 
medical profession.”). 
 5. See Scott Jaschik, A Cadaver, Facebook, Free Speech, INSIDE HIGHER ED (June 
21, 2012), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/06/21/minnesota-supreme-court-
upholds-punishment-student-over-facebook-posts (acknowledging that Tatro II “deals with 
an issue relevant . . . to a range of health professions programs that expect students to adhere 
to certain standards of professionalism, even before they become professionals”). 
 6. I use the word “alleged” here because, as will be seen later, the courts have in the 
vast majority of cases chosen not to interrogate the appropriateness of student statements, 
but rather engage in a level of judicial review that leads them (in cases the universities win) 
to endorse as sufficient the university’s judgment of the speech’s appropriateness.  Thus, the 
allegation is, for the most part, also the judgment. 
 7. See infra Part III.B (summarizing and discussing professional school case law).  
 8. See, e.g., Neal H. Hutchens, Commentary, A Delicate Balance: Faculty Authority 
to Incorporate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and 
University Students’ First Amendment Rights, 270 ED.  LAW.  REPORTER 371, 371 (2011) 
(arguing that incorporation of professional standards was appropriate in several recent 
cases); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification 
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, (2013) (arguing that schools can legitimately police 
student speech in professional degree programs because those programs “certify” graduates 
as fit to serve in their professions); Jeffrey C. Sun, Neal H. Hutchens, & James D. Breslin, A 
(Virtual) Land of Confusion with College Students’ Online Speech: Introducing the 
Curricular Nexus Test, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 49 (2013) (suggesting a test allowing 
universities to regulate off-campus, extracurricular student speech that reasonably relates to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns).  But see Andrew R. Kloster, Speech Codes Slipping Past 
the Schoolhouse Gate: Current Issues in Students’ Rights, 81 UMKC L. REV. 617 (2013) 
(describing professional standards cases as “permitting universities to use third-party 
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Prior to 2011, most of the notable cases had involved school counseling 
students who had refused to counsel non-heterosexual students in violation 
of their avowed religious beliefs. However, the recently decided Tatro v. 
University of Minnesota9 (hereinafter Tatro II10) saw this new jurisprudence 
extended to a mortuary science student who made off-color jokes on her 
Facebook page about her laboratory cadaver.11 
The Tatro cases represent a potentially dangerous overreach of public, 
educational institutional control over student speech.  While the speech at 
issue, in the professional student context, presents a reasonably nuanced 
question as to constitutional protection, the persuasive authority that might 
emerge from Tatro II threatens to leave too many other close questions on 
the wrong side of the jurisprudential line.  Sadly, Tatro’s untimely death12 
                                                                                                     
regulation of student speech to do an end-run around settled First Amendment doctrine”).  
 9. Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012) [hereinafter Tatro II] 
(holding that a professional student’s First Amendment free speech rights were not violated 
by a public university’s sanction for violation of conduct code based on established 
professional conduct). 
 10. In this Note, “Tatro I” will be used to refer to Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 
811 (Minn. App. 2011) [hereinafter Tatro I], the Minnesota Court of Appeals case that 
upheld the university’s disciplinary sanctions under familiar secondary-school standards, 
discussed infra at Part III.A.  Discussion of both Tatro cases is necessary both because of the 
differing analytical frameworks between the two courts and because their account of the 
factual record differs somewhat.  See infra note 106 (discussing relevant factual disparity 
between Tatro I and II). 
 11. See id. at 512–13 (summarizing content of Tatro’s Facebook posts).   
 12. See, e.g., Alyssa Creamer, Amanda Tatro Found Dead: University of Minnesota 
Graduate Who Sued School for Punishment Over Facebook Posts, THE HUFFINGTON POST 
(July 13, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/28/amanda-tatro-found-dead-
u_n_1635461.html (reporting Tatro’s death and collecting other news reports of her case).  
Tatro, who was only 31 years old, was found dead in her home by her husband.  Id.  Several 
news accounts indicate that Tatro did not have an easy life.  Id.  She apparently suffered 
from a nervous system disorder related to a traumatic brain injury, though it is unclear 
whether this was related to her death.  Id.  A former husband had sought a restraining order 
against her in 2007, alleging that she was “very unstable” and had been hospitalized for a 
drug overdose. See Emily Gurnon, Amanda Tatro, Who Challenged University of 
Minnesota’s Facebook Punishment, Had Turbulent Life, PIONEER PRESS, June 27, 2012, 
http://www.twincities.com/localnews/ci_20954862/amanda-tatro-who-challenged-
university-minnesotas-facebook-comments.  The former husband also alleged that Tatro had 
undergone weapons training.  Id.  The restraining order was refused, on the grounds that 
Tatro’s alleged conduct was merely “‘annoying’ behavior that appeared to be part of a bad 
breakup . . . .”  Id.  It may be worth wondering whether Tatro’s Facebook behavior was 
interpreted by her classmates in the context of what may have been a vaguely understood 
reputation; at any rate, the posts, though initially investigated as potential threats, were 
determined by police to be harmless.  See infra note 16 (discussing police investigation of 
Tatro’s Facebook posts). 
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several days after her loss in the Minnesota Supreme Court likely  the issue 
in her own uniquely illustrative case.13  This Note will argue that this 
watershed case gives too much “cover” to educational institutions that want 
to protect their public image, and further suggests that even this concern is 
better served by a hands-off approach when it comes to student social 
media activity that does not rise to the level of a potential physical threat.  
Part II will describe the complicated factual circumstances of Tatro II as 
well as the previous (and notably different) adjudication of the same facts in 
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Part III will summarize the legal 
framework that has guided student speech cases in various relevant 
contexts—on- and off-campus, secondary and post-secondary, online and 
off.  Part IV will analyze and apply several existing theories of educational 
speech to the professional student context presented in the Tatro cases, and 
Part V will explore the potential ramifications of these cases on emerging 
free speech problems. Finally, Part VI will offer two approaches to 
regulating off-campus, online speech by professional students—one 
couched in terms of “best practices” that might help a university avoid both 
bad publicity and expensive litigation, as well as a legal framework that 
discourages “unprofessional” speech that might be likened to false speech 
under recent U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
II.  Background: Tatro I and II 
The details and procedural history of the Tatro case are somewhat 
convoluted, in no small part because the case originated within a public 
university. While an advanced undergraduate student in the Mortuary 
Sciences program, and, importantly, enrolled in a human anatomy 
laboratory course at the University of Minnesota, Amanda Tatro made the 
following posts to her Facebook wall:14 
                                                                                                     
 13. Because the sanctions against Tatro were relatively slight, her grievance might not 
be seen as one capable of repetition, yet evading review.  One commenter has suggested, 
however, that free speech claims might be seen as “belonging” to society (as opposed to the 
individual litigants) if they “raise issues that are important to the living.” Kirsten Rabe 
Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 783 (2009). 
 14. At the time of Tatro’s posts, Facebook users almost universally drafted their 
“wall” posts as third-person sentences about themselves, to complement Facebook’s 
interface convention that caused all posts to be immediately preceded by the user’s full 
name.  In recent years this convention has fallen away. 
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• Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie today.  Let's 
see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding and having my scalpel taken 
away.  Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve ...  [November 12, 2009] 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to Monday's embalming 
therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to aspirate.  Give me room, 
lots of aggression to be taken out with a trocar.  [December 6, 2009] 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Who knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I 
still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though.  
Hmm ...  perhaps I will spend the evening updating my “Death List # 5” 
and making friends with the crematory guy.  I do know the code ...  
[December 7, 2009] 
• Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness that my best friend, 
Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next week.  I wish to 
accompany him to the retort.  Now where will I go or who will I hang 
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye Bernie.  Lock of hair in 
my pocket.  [Undated.]15 
The University police investigated these posts, but eventually 
determined that Tatro did not pose a threat to the university community.16 
Tatro was sanctioned by the university’s Campus Committee for 
Student Behavior in response to her Facebook posts, which Tatro described 
as “satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school 
experience.”17  Finding that Tatro had “violated the Student Conduct Code 
and academic program rules governing the privilege of access to human 
cadavers,” the Committee issued Tatro a failing grade for her anatomy 
course.18  Additionally, the Committee ordered Tatro “to enroll in a clinical 
ethics course; write a letter to mortuary-science department faculty 
addressing the issue of respect within the department and profession; and 
complete a psychiatric evaluation.”19  The specific “academic program 
rules” Tatro violated were a prohibition against “blogging” about her 
anatomy lab experience20 and treating human remains with inadequate 
                                                                                                     
 15. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512–13 (Minn. 2012). 
 16. Id. at 513.  When interviewed by campus police, Tatro stated that the potentially 
threatening content of the posts were references to favorite movies—for instance, “Death 
List # 5” was a reference to the two-part Quentin Tarantino film Kill Bill.  Id. 
 17. Id. at 511 (quoting court filing by petitioner Tatro). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 2011). 
 20. See id. at 818 (referring to anatomy lab course rule that “[b]logging about the 
anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not allowable”). 
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respect.21  In Tatro I,22 the Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld the sanctions 
on the theory that Tatro’s actions “‘materially and substantially disrupt[ed]’ 
the work and discipline of the university,” particularly the university’s 
anatomy bequest program, through which living donors pledge their bodies 
for the training of future mortuary science and medical students.23   
While the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the sanctions on Tatro, it 
dispensed with the lower court’s reasoning, holding instead that “a 
university does not violate the free speech rights of a student enrolled in a 
professional program when the university imposes sanctions for Facebook 
posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly tailored and 
directly related to established professional conduct standards.”24  This rule, 
the court stated, would “limit the potential for a university to create 
overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly reach into a university 
student’s personal life outside of and unrelated to the [student’s 
professional degree] program.”25   
Looking forward, the value of the Tatro case is its contribution to a 
discussion not of the university’s interest in maintaining an environment 
that is physically safe or otherwise free of disruption, but rather of a three-
sided relationship between universities, the professions, and the students 
trained for those professions by universities.26 
                                                                                                     
 21. See id.  (referencing the following anatomy lab course rules that “[h]uman material 
should always be handled with the greatest respect[,] [t]he body should be appropriately 
draped whenever possible[,]” and “[c]onversational language . . . outside the laboratory 
should be respectful and discreet”).  The Minnesota Court of Appeals accepted Tatro’s 
argument that because the rule referred specifically to draping the body, the rule “only 
applie[d] to the physical handling of the cadaver,” and thus she had not violated this part of 
the rules.  Id. 
 22. Id. at 822 (holding that mortuary science student’s Facebook posts violated 
conduct restrictions of laboratory course and constituted a substantial disruption of curricular 
activities, justifying academic sanctions). 
 23. See id. at 821 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 513 (1969)). Tinker and its progeny are discussed in detail infra Part III.A.  For a 
thorough analysis of Tatro I, including a persuasive argument that the Tinker standard 
should not apply to college students, see Meggen Lindsay, Note, Tinker Goes to College: 
Why High School Free Speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—
Tatro v. University of Minnesota, 38 WM.  MITCHELL L.  REV. 1470 (2012). 
 24. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Of course, First Amendment analysis is only called for in Tatro and the other cases 
under discussion in this Note because the students and programs in question are housed in 
public universities.  Just as obviously, however, many professional students get their training 
at private universities, where Constitutional rights apply with less, if any, force. 
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III.  The Existing First Amendment Legal Framework for Electronic, Off-
Campus Student Speech 
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has applied the same 
analytical frameworks used in secondary school cases to the college and 
university context.27  Thus, an analysis of the secondary school cases is 
important, even though the challenged behavior of a high school student 
may seem comically immature by comparison with the concerns of a 
university, and the interests served by compulsory education of minors is 
significantly different than that served by elective education of adults.28  
A.  School Speech Cases 
As the Supreme Court first famously stated in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District,29 teachers and students alike do 
not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at 
the schoolhouse gate.”30  While Tinker laid a strong baseline for student 
free speech in public schools, the Court emphasized that students’ free 
speech rights are cabined by the legitimate interests of schools.31  The Court 
held that speech that did not “substantially interfere with the work of the 
school or impinge upon the rights of other students” was not subject to 
legitimate school restriction.32 In describing a high school’s decision to 
forbid the wearing of black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, the 
Court noted that “an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might 
result from the [students’] expression” was an insufficiently compelling 
interest to justify the restriction on First Amendment speech rights.33 
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra note 69 and accompanying text (describing rationale for applying 
secondary school case law in the college setting). 
 28. See infra Part III.A for a more thorough discussion of this issue. 
 29. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (holding 
that on-campus student speech that materially disrupted the school environment was not 
subject to First Amendment protection). 
 30. Id. at 506. 
 31. See id. at 513 (explaining that students’ free speech rights did not prohibit a 
school’s “reasonable regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted 
circumstances”). 
 32. Id. at 509. 
 33. Id. at 510. 
WHAT YOU SIGN UP FOR 555 
The Court has departed from this speech-friendly stance in later cases.  
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,34 a student who delivered a 
nominating speech on behalf of a fellow student seeking a class office. In 
his speech, he “referred to his candidate in terms of an elaborate, graphic, 
and explicit sexual metaphor” was permissibly sanctioned by the high 
school.35  Fraser is interesting for its departure from Tinker as to speech the 
Court declared “offensively lewd and indecent . . . unrelated to any political 
viewpoint . . . [that] undermine[d] the school’s basic educational 
mission.”36  The Court was also at pains to point out that the speech was 
less protected because it was made on school grounds by a child.37  
Subsequent cases further develop the importance of both the location of the 
interdicted speech and the maturity of the speaker. The more mature the 
student, the more such speech is likely to be protected. Conversely, the 
more closely connected to an educational mission, and the less politically 
grounded the expression, the less likely constitutional protections will be 
triggered.38   
The power of school officials to sanction less offensive speech under 
the color of curriculum and school sponsorship was further developed in 
Hazelwood School District v.  Kuhlheimer,39 where school officials cut two 
pages of articles from a student newspaper.40  The articles in question were 
substantially less arguably “offensive” than the material found 
objectionable in Fraser—one described the experiences of students who 
had dealt with teenage pregnancy, the other the effect on a student of her 
                                                                                                     
 34. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding that 
student’s lewd, sexually graphic on-campus speech was not protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 35. Id. at 677–78 (1986). 
 36. Id. at 687. 
 37. See id. at 682 (“It does not follow . . . that simply because the use of an offensive 
form of expression may not be prohibited to adults making what the speaker considers a 
political point, the same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school.”). 
 38. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 402–03 (2007) (dismissing the dissent’s 
argument that the offending Bong HiTs 4 Jesus banner was part of a “political debate over 
the criminalization of marijuana”). 
 39. 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding that “educators do not offend the First 
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in 
school-sponsored activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”). 
 40. See id. at 262 (detailing school principal’s decision to remove the articles from the 
student publication). 
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parents’ divorce.41  Critical to distinguishing the situation from that in 
Tinker was the fact that the student newspaper’s readers might mistakenly 
attribute the articles’ content to the school, and not their authors alone. The 
Court stated that the articles “might reasonably [be] perceive[d] to bear the 
imprimatur of the school” and therefore could “fairly be characterized as 
part of the school curriculum.”42  Furthermore, because the newspaper was 
produced exclusively by members of a particular journalism class, for 
which student-editors received a grade, the Court recognized that 
“[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control” over such curricular 
speech “to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is 
designed to teach . . . so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”43  The importance of the paper’s place in 
the journalism curriculum (i.e., as a graded exercise) is inseparable, in 
Hazelwood, from the fact that the school published—and thus could be seen 
to endorse—its contents.  Future cases, especially professionalism cases, 
make the distinction important. 
Off-campus speech is subject to less regulation.44  A federal district 
court recently summarized the current state of constitutional regulation of 
off-campus speech this way: “[S]tatements are protected under the First 
Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless they are true 
threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are 
so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption 
in that environment.”45  This standard has the additional benefit of 
alignment with the common sense notion that outside of school, whatever 
rights students do “shed . . . at the schoolhouse gate,” they may pick up on 
their way home.46 
Notably, however, what constitutes the geographical and metaphysical 
boundaries of the school grounds for the purposes of institutional control 
over student speech is no simple matter of walls and fences. In Morse v. 
Frederick,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a group of students who 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. at 263 (describing the content of the articles removed from the paper). 
 42. Id. at 271. 
 43. Id. at 271–73. 
 44. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Had Fraser delivered the same 
speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been protected.”). 
 45. See R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. 
Minn. 2012) (summarizing the current state of governing law). 
 46. Tinker, 503 U.S. at 506. 
 47. Morse, 551 U.S. at 396 (2007) (holding that a high school principal did not violate 
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displayed a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” along the Olympic 
Torch Relay Route were subject to the kinds of restrictions on their speech 
that would apply if they were inside the school or attending a school-
sponsored activity.48  The offending students—one of whom was so late for 
school that at the time of the relay he was just arriving for the day—were 
across the street from the school, and thus not even physically on school 
property.49  Interestingly, the Court also dispensed with any idea that a 
banner censored by school authorities because it could be construed to 
promote the use of illegal controlled substances should be analyzed as 
political speech (and thus potentially deserving of greater protection), 
characterizing it instead in terms of Frederick’s desire to get on TV with his 
friends.50 
Unlike primary and secondary public schools, colleges and universities 
do not exercise “custodial and tutelary” care over their students, such as to 
“permit[] a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised 
over free adults.”51  Thus, while Tinker and its progeny have been used in 
analyzing higher education speech cases, such cases are rare.52 
                                                                                                     
a student’s First Amendment speech rights by confiscating a banner bearing the phrase 
“Bong HiTs 4 Jesus” on the basis that the message promoted illegal drug use). 
 48. Id. at 397. 
 49. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (describing the physical location of 
respondent Joseph Frederick, who was “late to school that day” and “joined his friends” (all 
but one of whom were [school classmates] across the street from the school to watch the 
event)). 
 50. See id. at 402–03 (stating that while Frederick’s motive for displaying the 
banner—to get on television—did not mitigate its content, the pro-drug message, his lack of 
political motivation stripped it of any First Amendment protection as a contribution to public 
debate).  The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a six-justice majority, sparred 
with Justice Stevens in dissent over this point. Justice Stevens questioned the Court’s 
readiness to endorse the principal’s determination that the banner promoted drug use, and 
called the message “nonsense.”  Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Nonetheless, he 
expressed concern in the event the banner did express that view.  Speculating “whether the 
fear of disapproval by those in the majority is silencing opponents of the war on drugs,” 
Justice Stevens wrote “[s]urely our national experience with alcohol [prohibition] should 
make us wary of dampening speech suggesting—however inarticulately—that it would be 
better to tax and regulate marijuana than to persevere in a futile effort to ban its use 
entirely.” Id. at 448 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 51. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995). 
 52. See Tatro I, 800 N.W. 2d 811, 821–22 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (finding that Tatro’s 
Facebook posts “materially and substantially disrupt[ed] the work and discipline of the 
university” using the Tinker standard). 
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B.  Professional School Cases 
The two leading cases in the realm of professional students’ First 
Amendment rights arise in school counseling programs.  They depart from 
the prior discussion inasmuch as they represent hybrid claims in which 
students asserted religious beliefs, communicated through expressive 
conduct, that were found to interfere with the conduct code of their chosen 
profession.  In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley,53 Jennifer Keeton, a student 
enrolled in a graduate-level counseling program at Augusta State 
University, made statements reflecting disapproval (based on her religious 
beliefs) of members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered 
(LGBTQ) population as well as her belief that non-heterosexuals suffered 
from a mental illness that could (and should) be treated.54  Keeton’s 
professors believed these statements indicated that she would not be able to 
practice in the school’s clinical program (or beyond) according to the 
professional standards of the American Counseling Association (ACA), 
compliance with which was a requirement of the counseling program.55  
Believing that she could not effectively complete the remediation plan her 
professors prescribed before allowing her to work with student clients in the 
university’s clinical program, Keeton withdrew from the program and 
sued.56  While school officials informed Keeton that she “was not being 
asked to alter her personal religious beliefs,” they did stress that failure to 
                                                                                                     
 53. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
university’s dismissal of a school counseling student who indicated that she would not 
affirm the sexual identity of non-heterosexual students, as well as the non-marital sexual 
activity of unmarried students, did not violate First Amendment speech protections). 
 54. See id. at 868 (“[Keeton] expressed to professors in class and fellow classmates in 
and out of class that she believed that the GLBTQ population suffers from identity 
confusion, and that she intended to attempt to convert students from being homosexual to 
heterosexual.”). 
 55. See id. at 869 (quoting relevant code provisions: “Counselors respect the dignity of 
clients . . .. [and] do not condone or engage in discrimination based on . . . gender identity, 
sexual orientation, marital status/partnership   . . . or any basis proscribed by law.”). 
 56. See id. at 870–71 (describing a remediation plan and Keeton’s reaction to it).  The 
plan set out by Keeton’s professors would have required her to read peer-reviewed scholarly 
articles on “improving counseling effectiveness for the GLBTQ population . . . familiarize 
herself with [a GLBTQ counseling association’s] Competencies for Counseling Gay and 
Transgender Clients” as well as attend GLBTQ community events and relevant counseling 
seminars, all with the intent of increasing Keeton’s exposure to, and presumably tolerance 
for, members of the GLBTQ population she might someday encounter in her counseling 
practice.  Id. at 870. 
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complete the remediation plan would result in her dismissal from the 
counseling program.57 
Since Keeton’s statements were not a publication or an address, the 
Eleventh Circuit viewed the counseling program itself as the “forum” for 
First Amendment purposes.58  Because the court deemed the counseling 
program a non-public forum, the court analyzed the restriction on Keeton’s 
speech—the remediation plan—for reasonableness and content-neutrality.59  
The court applied Hazelwood in two ways, finding, first, that the clinical 
program was a “‘school-sponsored expressive activit[y],’ as those who 
receive counseling in the program and members of the general public 
‘might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the imprimatur of the school.”60  
Second, both the clinical program and the remediation plan were “part of 
the school curriculum . . . supervised by faculty members and designed to 
impart particular knowledge or skills to [Keeton].”61  Thus, the school’s 
sanction of Keeton’s expressions of disapproval of LGBTQ individuals 
could be characterized as an “unwillingness to abide by [the university’s] 
curriculum.”62  
Julea Ward, a graduate counseling student at Eastern Michigan 
University, voiced similar, if less aggressive, concerns about counseling 
gay clients.63  Whereas Keeton had expressed an intention to practice 
conversion therapy, Ward consistently expressed only disapproval of 
homosexuality, as well as extramarital sex and some other heterosexual 
conduct.64  And whereas Keeton was not allowed to enter her program’s 
                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 871. 
 58. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 871 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We . . . find 
that ASU’s counseling program constitutes a nonpublic forum.”). 
 59. See id. at 872 (“[As a nonpublic forum], school officials ‘may impose restrictions 
on speech that are reasonable and viewpoint neutral’ . . . Accordingly, we must ask two 
questions . . . (1) whether the remediation plan was a reasonable restriction on her speech; 
and (2) whether the remediation plan was viewpoint neutral.”). 
 60. Id. at 875 (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 271). 
 61. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260, 271). 
 62. Id. at 878.  The degree to which the court relied on the ACA standards themselves 
is unclear.  The court analyzed the sanctions, finding them to be reasonable in light of the 
ACA standards, but did not address the ACA standards themselves. 
 63. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012) (“In three years with the 
program, Julea Ward frequently expressed a conviction that her faith (Christianity) 
prevented her from affirming a client’s same-sex relationships as well as certain 
heterosexual conduct, such as extra-marital relationships.”). 
 64. See id. at 729–30 (summarizing Ward’s religious convictions). 
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clinical program without completing a remediation plan, Ward was already 
practicing in a supervised clinic and had counseled two student-clients 
before her beliefs allegedly came into conflict with her professional 
conduct.65  Rather than expressing her disapproval in front of any student 
whose sexuality troubled her, Ward contacted her professor and supervisor 
with a request to refer her third client, who was gay, to another counselor.66  
At the behest of two of her professors, Ward participated in an “informal 
meeting . . . . designed ‘to assist [Ward] in finding ways to improve [her] 
performance or to explore the option of . . . voluntarily leaving the 
program.’”67  Ward agreed with her professors that “the development of a 
remediation plan would not be possible,” and after a formal review, was 
forced to leave the program.68  Unlike Keeton, who had merely expressed 
views that suggested she could not follow ACA guidelines in the future, 
Ward was informed by her professors that she had already failed to follow 
them.69 
In its analysis of Ward’s free speech claim, the court made several 
novel observations about the university free-speech environment in light of 
Hazelwood.  First of all, Hazelwood—a high school case—was applicable 
at the college level.70  Second, the increased maturity of college students 
did not necessarily decrease the extent to which their speech could be 
validly restricted—rather, the voluntary nature of higher education gave 
prospective students the opportunity “to learn what a curriculum requires 
before applying to the school and before matriculating there.”71  
Tatro sits somewhat uneasily alongside the professional cases.  
Whereas Ward and Keeton made their feelings known to their instructors 
                                                                                                     
 65. See id. at 731 (noting that Ward was enrolled in the clinical program and had 
counseled two students before the incident for which she was disciplined). 
 66. See id. (detailing Ward’s actions upon realizing, from a review of his file prior to 
their first meeting, that her next client would be a gay student who sought counseling related 
to his intimate relationships). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2012) (describing communication by a 
professor that Ward had violated two sections of the ACA code of ethics by “imposing 
values that are inconsistent with counseling goals” and “engag[ing] in discrimination based 
on . . . sexual orientation”) (substitutions in original). 
 70. See id. at 734 (“[F]or the same reason [the Hazelwood] test works for students who 
have not yet entered high school . . . it works for students who have graduated from high 
school.  The key word is student.”). 
 71. Id. 
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directly—Ward even going so far as to issue what might be fairly termed a 
warning—Tatro’s supposed inability to perform according to professional 
standards was determined indirectly, through report of her Facebook posts 
to others.72  Additionally, Keeton and Ward were—or were set to—practice 
their professions with clients through a clinical training exercise.73  Tatro, 
by contrast, was merely involved in a laboratory course using an 
anonymous donor,74 arguably an environment with little, if any, impact on 
the population served by practicing morticians.  Lastly, the counseling cases 
both involve religious convictions, whereas Tatro’s Facebook posts (and 
corresponding attitudes toward her profession) were secular.  The speech 
claims of Ward and Keeton, though, are no stronger for their invocation of 
another First Amendment right, for, as the Tenth Circuit has indicated, “the 
religious nature of [a speech claim] is not determinative . . . [t]he Supreme 
Court has never held that religious speech is entitled to more protection 
than non-religious speech.”75   
In Ward, the university initially won its motion for summary judgment 
in the district court.  Reversing, the Sixth Circuit highlighted a conflict 
between the program’s ACA-based ethical requirements and its actions 
toward Ward:  
[t]he key problem with the university’s position is not the adoption of 
this anti-discrimination policy, the existence of the practicum class or 
even the values-affirming message the school wants students to 
understand and practice.  It is that the school does not have a no-referral 
policy for practicum students and adheres to an ethics code that permits 
values-based referrals in general.76  
As in Tatro, the counseling program required clinical students to abide 
by the relevant professional standards, in this case those of the American 
                                                                                                     
 72. See Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. App. 2011) (noting that Tatro contacted 
the media after she was told by University Police not to come to campus pending further 
investigation, but before the office of student conduct submitted its formal complaint against 
her). 
 73. See Ward, 667 F.3d at 730 (describing actual client-contact aspect of clinical 
program); see also Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 869 (same). 
 74. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (describing laboratory course as 
relying on donated human cadavers under the same program as that supplying medical and 
dental schools, as opposed to performing volunteer funerary duties). 
 75. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1292 n. 13 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995)). 
 76. Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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Counseling Association (ACA).77  However, unlike the Minnesota Supreme 
Court, the Sixth Circuit was willing to engage (or at least order the district 
court to engage) in a careful reading of the relevant conduct code provision 
rather than deferring to the university’s supposedly academic 
determination.  The court stated that it was possible for a jury to decide that, 
by requesting that her client be referred to another counselor, she had in fact 
prevented her own potential discrimination against that client, thus 
upholding the relevant ACA standard.78 
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit noted that “the university setting [does 
not] invariably mean that educators have less discretion over their 
curriculum and class-oriented speech” than high school teachers.79  Because 
they are not compelled to enroll and can presumably make themselves 
aware of curricular requirements—even speech-related ones—“[w]hen a 
university lays out a program’s curriculum or class requirements for all to 
see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First Amendment veto 
over them.”80  This view has been criticized by scholars who argue that 
university students, because of their maturity, should be entitled to more, 
not less, freedom of expression.81 
One common theme in the professional standards cases is the courts’ 
adoption of the secondary-school doctrine permitting greater speech 
restrictions where student speech “might reasonably perceive[d] to bear the 
imprimatur of the school.”82 In Keeton, for example, the court determined 
                                                                                                     
 77. See id. at 731 (“The counseling program’s student handbook incorporates the ACA 
code of ethics and tells students, including practicum students, to follow it.”). 
 78. See id. at 735 (analyzing language in the ACA code of ethics that “Counselors [1] 
are aware of their own values, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and [2] avoid imposing 
values that are inconsistent with counseling goals”).  Interestingly enough, not only were 
Ward’s orthodox Christian views—and the fact that they precluded her from counseling gay 
clients—known to her instructors, see id., she had previously written a paper anticipating 
situations identical to the one that resulted in her expulsion.  See Ward v.  Wilbanks, No.  
09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428, at 1 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 2010) (“[Ward] wrote ‘[i]n 
situations were [sic] the value differences between a counselor and client are not amenable, 
‘standard practice’ requires that the counselor refer his/her client to someone capable of 
meeting their needs.’”).  Even more interestingly, Ward received “a perfect score” on the 
paper. Id. 
 79. Ward, 667 F.3d at 734. 
 80. Id. 
 81 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J.  
821, 879 (2008) (referring to college campuses as marketplaces of ideas and arguing that 
restrictions on college student speech are “less likely to be marketplace enhancing” than 
those on younger students). 
 82. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlheimer, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
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that members of the public—and, more importantly, clients taking 
advantage of the student counseling clinical services—could reasonably 
attribute the speech of a student counselor to the university sponsoring the 
program.83  In the Tatro cases, the University of Minnesota was clearly 
concerned that her expressions would affect the cadaver donation program, 
an outcome only possible if her allegedly disrespectful demeanor were 
attributed to her training program, and thus, the university.84 
C.  Social Media Cases 
Ordinarily, posts to social networking sites like Facebook would seem 
to be fairly clear examples of non-school sponsored or “off-campus” 
speech, and in fact, several cases have recognized broad protections for 
such posts.85  Furthermore, electronic speech that originates off-campus 
cannot be “brought” onto campus through the actions of another party.86  
Two recent Third Circuit cases grappled with students who made 
intentionally offensive social media profiles of secondary-school principals 
using images drawn from official school websites.87  In both cases, 
                                                                                                     
 83. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (applying Hazelwood to 
clinical counseling student’s refusal to counsel gay clients). 
 84. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 513 (Minn. 2012) (“[T]he Anatomy Bequest 
Program received letters and calls from donor families and the general public who expressed 
concerns about Tatro's lack of professionalism, poor judgment, and immaturity. Others 
questioned the University about the steps it would take to prevent something like this from 
happening in the future.”). 
 85. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that 
student who created “lewd and offensive” Facebook profile purporting to be school 
principal’s, using a picture from the school’s website but his own computer, was beyond the 
reach of the school’s power to discipline);  see also J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir.  2011) (holding, similarly, that a middle school student’s fake MySpace 
profile of a principal using “adult language and sexually explicit content” was protected off-
campus speech in spite of school’s policy against student use of such language). 
 86. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 933 (declining to hold that off-campus 
activities could be deemed to have occurred on school grounds when printouts of the 
offending page were brought to school by a student, on the principal’s orders). 
 87. For reasons not wholly relevant here, the fake social media profile cases call to 
mind the recent phenomenon of fake celebrity or public official Twitter profiles.  Some of 
these profiles are incredibly popular and are even coming to be recognized as a kind of art.  
See, e.g., Sarah Fitzmaurice, Who to Follow on Twitter? Not the Real Stars . . . The Fake 
Profiles are Far Funnier, THE DAILY MAIL [UK], Feb. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/tvshowbiz/article-1358008/Who-follow-Twitter-Not-real-stars--
fake-profiles-far-funnier.html (praising fake profiles purporting to represent, among others, 
the Queen of England, and encouraging readers to follow the fake profiles instead of the real 
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however, the students used their own computer equipment and did not 
construct the profiles at school.88  The court refused to adopt “a rule that 
allows school officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place 
anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school official, 
is brought to the attention of a school official, and is deemed ‘offensive.’”89 
Professional education presents a scenario in which traditionally non-
academic conduct can plausibly be treated as if it were curricular, because 
such programs arguably must provide an education in professional 
conduct.90  If one of the objectives of public education is to “inculcate 
fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system,” then a parallel, perhaps even more practical objective of 
professional education is a similar inculcation of fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of that profession.91  Counselors must be 
inclusive and affirming. Lawyers must protect their clients’ secrets.  
Morticians must be respectful of the dead.  Professional schools will quite 
naturally seek to keep a tight rein on student conduct, since the public—and 
scholars—may attribute bad professional behavior to the quality of 
education provided in the professional schools.92  
One interesting thread that appears in the relevant cases is the degree 
to which students had advance notice that their expressions violated a 
conduct standard.  In Fraser, for example, the student who gave a sexually 
indecent speech in a school-sponsored forum had been advised by two of 
his teachers that the content—which they reviewed in advance—would be 
                                                                                                     
ones). 
 88. See Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d at 920 (noting that the student made the 
offending fake profile at home); see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 
216 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[W]e do not think that the First Amendment can tolerate the School 
District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s home and reaching Justin while 
he is sitting at her computer after school . . .”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, Enforcement of Law Schools’ Non-Academic Honor 
Codes: A Necessary Step Towards Professionalism?, 89 NEB. L. REV. 634, 636 (2011) 
(arguing that law schools present a singular opportunity for inculcating future lawyers with 
“meaningful training in professionalism”). 
 91. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.675, 681(1986) (quoting Ambach v. 
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76–77 (1979)) (substitutions in original). 
 92. See Nicola A. Boothe-Perry, supra note 90, at 652 (“Judging by the number of 
reported complaints of unprofessional behavior and the general demise of the reputation of 
the profession [of law], it is apparent that the cursory treatment of professionalism in the 
historical law school tenure is deficient.”). 
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“inappropriate” and “might have ‘severe consequences.””93  The Ward 
court’s warning that university students could make themselves aware of 
curricular requirements prior to enrolling in particular programs seems to 
echo this idea.94  While it is certainly true of certain aspects of the 
professions that an applicant needs to be aware of what he or she is signing 
up for—medical, mortuary, and law students alike may be expected to put 
aside a certain level of squeamishness about blood and other bodily 
fluids—extending the curriculum’s control over outputs as well as inputs 
may give universities too much power. 
D.  Reconciling Academic Freedom with Academic Speech Restrictions: 
“Institutional Free Speech” 
One scholar, Joseph Blocher, has argued that institutions that tend to 
increase the free flow of information—those that enhance the marketplace 
of ideas—should be granted judicial deference only inasmuch as those 
institutions do, in fact, improve that marketplace.95  Professor Blocher’s 
work is a modification of economic theories that make the same claim 
about financial and material goods markets and the institutions which tend 
to increase economic efficiency and decrease transaction costs.96  While this 
“New Institutional First Amendment” explains and justifies all of the 
Supreme Court’s recent rulings on middle- and high-school restrictions on 
speech,97 Professor Blocher argues that colleges and universities 
“contribution to the efficiency of the marketplace of ideas . . . does not 
require or justify extensive internal speech regulations.”98 
Blocher likens educational institutions to commercial institutions by 
observing that “[u]niversities lower information search costs by making 
                                                                                                     
 93. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678. 
 94. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting voluntariness of 
university coursework and availability of information to potential students). 
 95. See Blocher, supra note 81 at 880 (“Universities are thus entitled to institutional 
deference when it comes to speech regulations that improve, not limit, the free flow of 
information and ideas.”). 
 96. See id. at 838–47 (describing “new institutional economics” theory recognizing 
role of “institutions that regularize interactions and lower transaction costs,” justifying 
lessened government regulation). 
 97. See id. at 872–76 (analyzing Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse in terms of new 
institutional first amendment theory and concluding that recent decisions “demonstrate[d] an 
increasing institutional awareness”). 
 98. Id. at 879. 
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ideas and information widely available and more easily accessible . . . [and] 
lower search and measurement costs for students and faculty by equipping 
them with better analytic tools with which to evaluate new ideas.”99  Like 
repeat commercial players, then, universities have a vested interest in 
abiding by the norms established through consistent institutional practice—
the norms of the ideological market.100 
While purporting to deny universities the sort of power to regulate 
speech that may be more appropriate in high schools, Professor Blocher’s 
theory still grants extensive institutional deference to universities, and 
perhaps more troubling, the power to determine what will fall within that 
deference.101  It is far from clear whether Facebook posts like Tatro’s, or 
religious positions like Ward’s, would be included within the realm of 
market-enhancing expressions that could be seen as contributing to the 
intellectual discourse of mortuary science.  Even identifying the relevant 
inquiry may be difficult—is the appropriateness of the applicable 
professional guidelines themselves an open intellectual question?  What 
about whether a particular statement falls inside or outside those guidelines’ 
boundaries?  Blocher identifies the possibility of institutional abuse and 
asks: “What happens when otherwise ‘good’ institutions apply their internal 
rules in a way that does not advance the marketplace of ideas? Does an 
educational institution—which would otherwise be entitled to great 
deference from courts—still get deference when it limits speech for reasons 
unrelated to the marketplace of ideas?”102 
For Blocher, the answer is no, but only because individual universities 
who break with traditional speech-promoting norms are not representative 
of the “institutions” to which they belong when they do so.103  To determine 
whether an educational organization, such as an individual university, had 
misapplied the relevant institutional norms, courts would have to conduct a 
harder look than is typical in academic cases—a task Blocher feels is within 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id. at 857. 
 100. See id. (describing universities’ incentives to abide by the standards set by the 
community of higher education institutions). 
 101. See id. at 856 (noting that the comparison to economic institutions is apt because 
market efficiencies are what determine the institutional norms established by these market 
players). 
 102. Id. at 860. 
 103. See id. (identifying the difference between “institutions,” like academia, and 
“organizations” like, e.g.,  Duke University). 
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the competence of the court.104  The Sixth Circuit’s remand in Ward may 
indicate that at least some judges are willing to undertake such a case-by-
case analysis in the case of professional codes applied to students. 
Another potential area of conflict can arise between ideological 
institutions within a single entity.   A university is not an ideological 
monolith, but is arguably composed of several (ideological) market-shaping 
institutions.  As Professor Blocher points out, a university’s students, 
faculty, and administration may have different interests to protect in any 
clash over speech.105  “Disaggregat[ing] the institution” of academia, 
however, reveals even more composite institutions than Blocher 
identifies.106  As the recent Penn State sex-abuse scandal revealed in 
horrific fashion, collegiate athletics are an institutional force so powerful 
that they can overcome many of the larger and ostensibly dominant 
ideological institutions represented by an individual university.107 
Not only may different organizational parts of a university have 
different ideological interests, different academic units108 may assume 
differing relationships from one another to the ideological institutions they 
represent.  Professional schools may have a different role to play in the 
marketplace of ideas than the traditional academic departments.  Whereas 
the academic departments can be more exclusively devoted to the 
production of knowledge itself, professional schools are obligated by their 
mission to produce qualified employees, not only to individual sectors of 
the economy but often to specific positions within those sectors (law 
schools, for example, train only lawyers and not paralegals).  A professional 
                                                                                                     
 104. See id. at 862. 
Determining whether an organization is misapplying its institutional norms 
would, of course, require courts to investigate the content and application of 
those norms.  But that would be no more difficult . . . than their responsibility to 
investigate . . . whether a particular limitation on speech amounts to viewpoint 
discrimination. 
 105. See id. at 878 (“[W]ho exactly is it that ‘challenges conventional wisdom,’ . . . ?”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE 
COUNSEL REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO 
THE CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY, 14 (July 12, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/12/sports/ncaafootball/13pennstate 
-document.html (finding that the University’s President acted in concert with the Athletic 
Director and Head Football Coach to conceal repeated instances of sexual abuse from the 
Board of Trustees). 
 108. In this context, it is interesting to recall that the different academic units are often 
known as “colleges”—“College of Liberal Arts”, “College of Engineering,” etc. 
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school, then, has obligations not only to inculcate its students with the 
professional and behavioral norms of the profession it serves, but also to 
(reasonably) guarantee the professional suitability of its graduates—it must 
produce graduates who are fit to serve.  In sensitive professions, this fitness 
could include minimal or nonexistent controversiality, which could in 
theory extend to a student’s social media presence.   A more conservative 
assessment of the traditional sphere of academic matters, however, might 
exclude social media expressions from a college’s realm of academic 
authority—or at least limit the university’s role to education, rather than 
enforcement.   
Emily Gold Waldman expresses a contrary view, arguing that 
professional academic programs perform a “certifying” function by 
“signing off on their students’ fitness to enter the profession in question.”109  
Thus, schools can plausibly argue that the Hazelwood standard should 
apply, not because their speech bears the school’s “imprimatur,” but rather 
because the graduates themselves bear it.110  Dovetailing with the idea of 
universities as First Amendment actors, Professor Waldman even suggests 
that the policing of its future graduates’ speech can be seen as the 
university’s protected speech act.111 Such control is appropriate, Waldman 
argues, as long as the university or program can “articulate the nature of 
their concern and explain why it was indeed legitimate in light of 
professional standards and expectations.”112   
There are two potential problems with this theory.  The first is that it 
barely places any burden on a degree-granting entity.  All degree programs 
arguably place some kind of university-imprimatur of fitness on their 
graduates, in the sense that they “certify” that a student has obtained a 
threshold amount of subject-matter knowledge.  Likewise, their grade point 
averages “certify” a particular level of competence in that subject matter—
even in the age of grade inflation.   In today’s job market, it would not be 
hard for any university program to claim employability as a legitimate 
pedagogical concern.   
                                                                                                     
 109. Waldman, supra note 8, at 383. 
 110. Id. at 405.   
 111.  See id. at 405–06 (noting that “by facilitating professional students’ entry into the 
field . . . the university is engaging in its own sort of speech” and describing the granting of a 
degree as an implicit statement that the graduate is “fit to enter the profession”).     
 112. Id. at 407.   
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The second problem is that other entities are ultimately responsible for 
a professional’s fitness.  Governmentally-sanctioned agencies are 
frequently responsible for licensing professionals—in the case of a law 
school graduate, for example, numerous barriers—the bar exam, character 
and fitness review, even the Multistate Professional Responsibility test—
stand between earning a juris doctorate and  becoming a lawyer.  
Furthermore, assigning responsibility for a professional’s fitness to his or 
her alma mater could allow individual employers to lean too heavily on 
institutional “certification.” 
E.  Are Facebook Posts “Private” or “Public” Speech? 
The Tatro court emphasized the public nature of Facebook posts, 
noting that her privacy settings allowed her posts to be read by “Friends” 
and “Friends of Friends.”113  This setting allows posts to be disseminated 
not only to people the user actively admits to her network, but also to 
people those users admit to their networks.114 The court characterized this 
level of security as the functional equivalent of “blogging” (which was 
expressly forbidden on the laboratory course’s syllabus).115 While a 
potentially large group of people, however, this setting is in fact finite, and 
could be argued to fall short of general publication. 
Determining whether Facebook posts are public or private is critical in 
determining whether a student, like, Tatro, whose posts may violate speech 
restrictions have acted unprofessionally.  According to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, Tatro’s posts were public: “[T]he University is not 
sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, but for Facebook posts that 
could be viewed by thousands of Facebook users and for sharing the 
Facebook posts with the news media.”116  Because of the inconsistency 
between the lower court’s and the Supreme Court’s decisions, it is not 
possible to know just how widely Tatro’s Facebook network was—whether 
the posts were visible to hundreds or thousands of visitors.117  Further 
                                                                                                     
 113. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012). 
 114 See Choose Who You Share With, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/459 
934584025324/ (under “Your Audience Options,” select “What audiences can I choose from 
when I share?”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (defining various privacy levels for Facebook 
posts). 
 115 Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 512. 
 116. Id. at 523. 
 117. Compare Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 523 (stating that sanctions were based on 
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complicating the situation is the issue of Tatro’s sharing of her posts with 
media outlets, and the fact that this additional and exponentially wider 
dissemination of her alleged unprofessional attitudes occurred only after the 
university sanctioned her.118  
Commenters that have studied social media forms have pointed to the 
multiplicity of uses to which Facebook users put their online expressions.  
One scholar refers to the “endemic” narcissism of many Facebook users, 
whose primary goals are to become famous—or infamous—within their 
ever-widening social circles.119  Another identifies internet-facilitated 
speech as “the core of how [young people] understand communication with 
each other.”120  The latter understanding ironically suggests that the 
frequency of users’ Friends’ status updates, combined with the frequency 
with which all users check in with (and, by extension, mentally dismiss) 
what their Facebook friends post, actually robs individual posts of their 
noteworthiness.121  In other words, Facebook statuses are so public—or 
rather, so many of them are so equally public—that they lose their function 
as potentially disruptive public statements.122  Thus, it is highly unlikely 
that any one Facebook post, no matter how scathing or offensive, could be 
“sufficiently noteworthy that the student body would react to it in a manner 
that could be disruptive to the school campus.”123   
                                                                                                     
“Facebook posts that could be viewed by thousands of Facebook users”) with Tatro I, 800 
N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. App. 2011) (“Tatro’s Facebook settings allowed her ‘friends’ and 
‘friends of friends’ to view these postings; Tatro acknowledges that this group includes 
hundreds of people.”). 
 118. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 513 (“Tatro, believing that she had been suspended, 
attempted to bring attention to her punishment by reporting the incident to, and sharing her 
Facebook posts with, the news media.”). 
 119. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV. J. 
L. & TECH 1, 16 (2007). 
 120. Bryan Starrett, Tinker’s Facebook Profile: A New Test for Protecting Student 
Cyber Speech, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 212, 225 (2009). 
 121. See id. at 233 (describing the second prong of a new two part test to apply the 
Tinker framework to various forms of internet speech). 
 122. See id. (describing the effect of new Facebook posts by individual  users on 
members of their online networks). 
 123. Id. 
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F.  Speech Restriction in Governmentally-Licensed Professions and Public 
Employees 
As a somewhat corollary matter for the purposes of this Note, there 
have been cases where the Supreme Court has addressed the idea that the 
state’s licensure of a professional entails a licensee to speak in a 
professional capacity.  In this sense, the “speech” regulated by the licensure 
scheme is typically the communication between the licensee professional 
and his or her client-customer.124  The most prominent and easily 
understood examples are lawyers, whose written and spoken speech acts 
constitute legal advice subject to regulation when the listener is a client,125 
and physicians, whose written and spoken speech acts can constitute 
medical advice when the listener is a patient.126  The Supreme Court has 
addressed this form of speech regulation in two prominent cases, both 
involving speech prohibited by statute because it involved solicitation for 
services.127  While these cases apparently address only whether the state can 
regulate who can offer professional services through speech acts that create 
a professional relationship (and which are thus not pure speech, but rather 
“speech incidental to conduct”),128 the analysis that leads to the Court’s 
conclusions is illuminating for the light it sheds on the legitimate 
government interests that give rise to the speech restrictions within the 
professions.129 
                                                                                                     
 124. See Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the First 
Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 910–11 (2000) (deriving from Lowe v. SEC, 472 
U.S. 181 (1985), a case involving unlicensed investment advisors, that advice must be both 
“person to person” and “characteristic dependent,” in the sense that it responds to a specific 
client’s needs, to fall within the government’s ability to regulate it through licensing). 
 125. See id. at 893–95 (noting both expressive and non-expressive quality of lawyers’ 
advice to, and action on behalf of, clients). 
 126. See id. at 894 (“When a doctor writes a prescription for a patient, she is doing 
more than simply recommending a remedy. The prescription has legal significance because 
it authorizes a pharmacist to deliver a[n otherwise illegal] prescription medication to the 
patient . . . .”). 
 127. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting 
that “the state may . . . determine . . . who makes a business or a livelihood of soliciting 
funds or memberships for unions”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 
(1978) (holding that a state may sanction lawyers for the in-person solicitation of clients). 
 128. Kry, supra note 124, at 891. 
 129. See id. at 890 (arguing that by requiring licensing of professionals before they can 
enter certain types of speech-dependent relationships, states enact a kind of “prior restraint” 
on this kind of speech).  Kry’s argument is weakened in light of his own analysis that these 
speech acts do more than communicate information, but in fact create legal relationships, see 
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It is unclear whether a state should sanction a licensed professional for 
giving bad advice—such situations typically give rise to the private right of 
action (malpractice) by the client against the licensee.130  State lawyer 
sanctions, for example, are more common for failure to abide by standards 
of conduct incident to the substance of the lawyer-client relationship (such 
as failure to maintain proper records or improper disclosure of confidential 
information).  Malpractice is a private tort; ineffective assistance of counsel 
is a legal remedy.  Courts are split as to whether a lawyer’s expressive out-
of-court statements violate civility rules.131 
Viewing professional students as quasi-employees by virtue of their 
courses of study would afford them even less Constitutional protection than 
even students typically enjoy.  Public employees may have their speech 
rights limited substantially by their government employers.132  
Traditionally, the Court has authorized a balancing test “between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen . . . and the interest of the State, as 
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees.”133  Notably, however, the Constitutionally-
protected interests of such employees extend only to speech “on matters of 
public concern.”134  Private speech that involves “only matters of personal 
interest,” by contrast, receives no special First Amendment protection 
                                                                                                     
infra note 125 and accompanying text. The general idea of profession-licensing tends to 
suggest only a gate-keeping, rather than a case-by-case censoring, function of the 
appropriate restrictions. 
 130. See id. at 906 (suggesting that Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181 (1985), a case 
involving unlicensed investment advisors, “can be read to suggest that government 
regulation of professional speech is permissible only when the communication occurs in the 
context of a fiduciary relationship”). 
 131. See Justices of the App. Div., 1st Dept. v. Erdmann, 33 N.Y. 2d 559, 559–60 
(reversing disciplinary action against an attorney for “isolated instances of . . . vulgar and 
insulting words” in reference to a judge, published in a magazine article”), State Bar v. 
Semaan, 508 S.W. 2d 429, 431–32 (Tex. App. 1974) (affirming lower court finding that 
letter to the editor calling trial judge “‘a midget among giants’” in reference to other, 
allegedly wiser judges was not misconduct); but see Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W. 
2d 165, 168 (Ky. 1980) (“We are not alone in our opinion that by coming to the bar an 
attorney incurs the ethical obligation not to bring the bench and bar into disrepute by 
unfounded public criticism.”). 
 132. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“[I]t cannot be gainsaid 
that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that 
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general.”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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beyond that existing between an employee and a private employer.135  Thus, 
while a teacher may not be disciplined for writing a letter to the local 
newspaper criticizing the school board’s handling of fund-raising 
proposals,136 a district attorney may be fired for circulating a questionnaire 
to coworkers about a supervisor’s office policies.137 
One employee speech case is particularly noteworthy for its potential 
relevance to students like Tatro.  In U.S. v. National Treasury Employees 
Union,138 the Court struck down a ban on honoraria for public employees’ 
literary products that fell outside the scope of their official duties.139  The 
Court protected the employee’s right to receive compensation for their work 
on the grounds that it fell “within the protected category of citizen comment 
on matters of public concern rather than employee comment on matters 
related to personal status in the workplace.”140  Critical to the Court’s 
analysis were that the statutory prohibition on payment imposed a 
substantial burden on the employees’ expressive activity141 and the fact that 
the activities described “were addressed to a public audience, were made 
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their 
government employment.”142  While Justice Stevens referred in his majority 
opinion to notable federal employee-authors Nathaniel Hawthorne, Walt 
                                                                                                     
 135. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 136. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (requiring “proof of false statements knowingly or 
recklessly made” before a public school teacher may be dismissed when public statements 
regard “issues of public importance”). 
 137. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (holding that state district attorney’s office did not 
violate the First Amendment rights of employee who circulated a questionnaire “most 
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal office policy”). 
 138. U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (holding that 
provision in Ethics and Government Act that prohibited federal employees from receiving 
payment for giving speeches or writing articles violated employees’ First Amendment 
rights). 
 139. See id. at 461–62 (describing some of the employees jobs and literary products).  
Some examples cited by the court included, e.g., “a lawyer for the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission who . . . published articles on Russian history . . . [a] mail handler [who] had 
given lectures on the Quaker religion . . . [and a] microbiologist at the Food and Drug 
Administration [who] had earned almost $3,000 per year writing articles and making radio 
and television appearances reviewing dance performances.”  Id. 
 140. Id. at 466. 
 141. See id. at 469 (“Publishers compensate authors because compensation provides a 
significant incentive toward more expression.  By denying respondents that incentive, the 
honoraria ban induces them to curtail their expression if they wish to continue working for 
the Government.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
 142. Id. at 466. 
574 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 547 (2014) 
Whitman, and Herman Melville,143 none of the identified plaintiffs who 
challenged the statute were poets or novelists. 
These cases draw distinctions between the kinds of expressive activity 
that may bring a public employer’s powers closer to those of a private 
employer; just because the government or its proxy can fire an employee 
for certain speech does not mean that the employee is subject to civil 
liability for that speech.144  Public employees do not enjoy First 
Amendment rights that private employees do not, only a relationship with 
their employer that is influenced by Constitutional rights.  In that sense, the 
situation is somewhat analogous to the distinction between private and 
public-school students. 
An argument could be made that because the state is training 
professional students at public universities to serve in publicly regulated 
professions, similar standards should apply.145  Assuming that Tatro’s 
comments about her cadaver specimen do not constitute expressions on 
matters of public concern, then, the university, acting as a quasi-employer, 
would be justified in disciplining her.  This interpretation is strengthened if 
the posts are determined to be related to her “employment” in the sense that 
they would not have come into being but for her university-facilitated 
presence in the anatomy lab.146  Important differences between professional 
                                                                                                     
 143. See id. at 464 (“Respondents have yet to make comparable contributions to 
American culture [to those of Whitman, Hawthorne, and Melville], but they share with these 
great artists important characteristics that are relevant to the issue we confront.”).  Justice 
Stevens did not identify whether the common issues encompassed the equivalence of 
creative and scholarly work for the purposes of determining what constitutes matters of 
public concern.  One might wonder whether subject matter is a relevant factor—whether, for 
example, an employee who could not be disciplined for writing a novel about the dark heart 
of the human soul could be fired for starring in pornographic films.  The latter case may 
soon find its way into the federal courts.  See Wendy Leung, Oxnard Teacher, Fired for 
Performing in Porn Films, Appeals to Court to Get her Job Back, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, 
Feb. 22, 2013, available at www.vcstar.com/news2013/feb/22/oxnard-teacher-fired-for-
performing-in-porn-to/ (describing pending California state-court appeal of public middle 
school teacher dismissed for taking pornographic film roles during eight months prior to 
employment). 
 144. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,147 (“We in no sense suggest that [employee] 
speech on private matters falls into one of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression 
which carries so little social value, such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit and punish 
such expression by all persons in its jurisdiction.”). 
 145. See Waldman, supra note 8, at 414–18 (analyzing in greater detail, and ultimately 
rejecting, the “public employee analogy” of professional students).   
 146. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 411 (2006) (“Restricting speech that owes 
its existence to a public employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any 
liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise 
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students at public universities and professional public employees must alter 
this analysis, however. 
On the one hand, professional students—especially those not involved 
in direct client contact through a clinical education program—are not true 
employees.147  Nor are they yet licensed professionals in their field, fully 
subject to licensing requirements.  On the other, even non-clinically-
engaged professional students are arguably in the process of being initiated 
into publicly-licensed professions by means, in these cases, of government 
entities.  Without the public university’s approval, in the form of a passing 
grade, these students cannot enter their chosen professions in the first 
place.148  As Tatro’s avowed difficulties in finding employment149 
subsequent to her dispute with the University illustrate, professional 
programs can more closely resemble a pipeline with few honorable exits 
than a branching path that can only open opportunities as the student 
progresses chronologically through the course of study.  The control a 
public university exercises over its professional students’ future licensure 
would seem to necessitate either more control over student speech and 
behavior (emphasizing the government’s role in protecting its citizens from 
unqualified professionals), or less control (emphasizing the student’s 
relatively vulnerable role as an as-yet uneducated aspirant who has placed 
so much control over her future livelihood in a government institution’s 
hands).  In any event, the courts in Ward, Keeton, and Tatro have not 
applied professional or public-employee doctrines to the case of 
professional student cases, relying instead on the deference traditionally 
afforded universities in prescribing curriculum. 
 
                                                                                                     
of employer control over what the employer itself has commissioned or created.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 147. Several cases illuminate an importantly different situation: when a student’s 
clinical placement is outside the school.  In these cases, courts have applied the employer-
employee rules and upheld sanctions that resulted from a clinical student being “fired” from 
his or her outside “employer.”  See Waldman, surpa note 8, at 398–401 (discussing various  
cases). 
 148. See, supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
 149. See Kaitlin Walker & Katherine Lymn, From Facebook to Court: U Defends 
Discipline, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at http://www.mndaily.co 
m/2012/02/13/facebook-court-u-defends-discipline (stating Tatro’s belief that she has “had 
trouble getting jobs and internships since the case began”). 
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IV.  Tatro and the Professional Student Cases 
A.  The Emergence of “Established Professional Standards” in University 
Conduct Cases 
While the specific facts in Tatro may be idiosyncratic, the case arises 
in the broader context of public universities’ struggle to determine how, if 
at all, online student speech may be constrained by conduct codes.  It is 
particularly noteworthy that the Minnesota Supreme Court abandoned the 
lower appeals court’s analysis along the Tinker line of substantial 
disruption cases, and instead crafted a new standard related to established 
professional conduct codes. 
The new test may have been a departure in the procedural posture of 
Tatro, but similar tests had been applied in other cases.150  Commentator 
Neal H. Hutchens has used the Ward and Keeton cases to illustrate the rise 
of this trend in allowing expanded restriction of student speech according to 
professional-conduct code-related speech, arguing that such standards are 
constitutionally appropriate.  As Hutchens points out, the district courts 
granted summary judgment in these cases on the grounds that “[t]he 
judiciary’s review of academic decisions is limited.”151  
Limited judicial review of “academic” decisions—as distinguished 
from behavioral “disciplinary” decisions—stems from the so-called 
“academic freedom” protections of universities.152  Somewhat ironically, 
“academic freedom” so characterized is based on the university’s right to 
define its curriculum—a right seen as necessary by the courts and derived 
from the first amendment itself.153  The University of Minnesota, in reacting 
to Tatro’s conduct through giving her a failing grade, was able to 
                                                                                                     
 150. See Neal H. Hutchens, Comment, A Delicate Balance: Faculty Authority to 
Incorporate Professionalism Standards into the Curriculum Versus College and University 
Students’ First Amendment Rights, 270 ED. LAW REP. 371, (2011) (summarizing cases in 
which courts upheld speech restrictions based on professional conduct standards for 
professional students). 
 151. Ward v. Wilbanks, No. 09-CV-11237, 2010 WL 3026428, at 15 (E.D. Mich.  July 
26, 2010). 
 152. See Jack E. Byrom, Note, To Love and Die in Dixon: An Argument for Stricter 
Judicial Review in Cases of Academic Misconduct, 31 REV. LITIG. 147 (2012) (providing 
background of academic/disciplinary distinction). 
 153. See Brown v.  Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir.  2002) (stating that a university “has 
discretion to engage in its own expressive activity of prescribing its curriculum”). 
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characterize its actions as “academic” rather than “disciplinary”—and gain 
the protection of a much more deferential judicial posture.154 
The professional standards cases problematize this dual standard.155  In 
courses of study aimed at training students for regulated professions—
including programs in counseling, law, and mortuary science—students 
must be taught the relevant standards of professional conduct.  When these 
students move beyond the classroom and into clinical training, their 
adherence to the professional standards can, arguably, be legitimately 
imported into the curriculum; that is to say, a student’s ability to adhere to 
the rules of her profession not only protects her clients, but also 
demonstrates her mastery of her program’s course content. 
Such a characterization, however, places an important burden on 
university faculty and administrators not to blur the line between 
curriculum and discipline.  Cases like Ward and Keeton—where students’ 
alleged speech-related misconduct occurs, or threatens to occur, in the 
context of contact with an actual client and is directly related to their 
professional activities—are, arguably, less “close,” in the jurisprudential 
sense, than cases like Tatro, where the “speech” occurs in a classroom 
setting and the student is engaged in an educational activity insulated from 
the public (such as a laboratory).  Of course, the preceding analysis assumes 
that a situation like Tatro’s involves in-class conduct at all, ignoring the fact 
that the Facebook posts were not actually made from the lab.  For Tatro, the 
appropriateness of a Facebook post depended on her status as a student—
her posts fell within the ambit of the mortuary science curriculum because 
Tatro was enrolled in it.  Setting such wide boundaries for what a student 
can be graded on (and failed for) forces students constantly to second-guess 
their actions on and off-campus, to wonder where and how—and why, in 
particular instances—their performance is being evaluated.  As the 
professional speech cases discussed above point out, such behavioral 
requirements are not even universally understood to apply to professionals 
after they are licensed. 
                                                                                                     
 154. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 522 (“Although ‘a university’s interest in academic 
freedom’ does not ‘immunize the university altogether from First Amendment challenges,’ 
courts have concluded that a university ‘has discretion to engage in its own expressive 
activity of prescribing its curriculum’ and that it is appropriate to ‘defer[] to the university’s 
expertise in defining academic standards and teaching students to meet them.’”) (quoting 
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950, 952 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 155. See Byrom, supra note 152, at 151 (suggesting that universities have disguised 
disciplinary decisions as “academic” in order to avoid higher due process requirements). 
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B.  Problems Specific to Tatro II 
1.  Tatro II Is Not Consistent with the Emerging “Established Professional 
Standards” Jurisprudence 
Because it represents the furthest extent to which a court has stretched 
a public university’s ability to punish a student for his or her speech, it is 
not surprising that commentators and scholars have begun to cite it as part 
of the jurisprudential trend that includes Ward and Keeton.156  Nonetheless, 
Tatro is not a natural extension of the doctrine that appears to be 
developing in these cases. 
The students in both Ward and Keeton were sanctioned for expressions 
that demonstrated an inability to abide by the ethical norms of their 
profession as such—they said, openly, in conversations with their 
professors and in classroom environments, that they could not counsel 
LGBTQ clients.157  The expressions were about the student’s inability to 
comply with the curriculum, and were addressed to faculty members and 
other students in a curricular setting.  Tatro, by contrast, posted comments 
on Facebook that, while arguably unprofessional, were also in a sense non-
professional, in the sense that they did not take place in the context of her 
academic program.  To the extent that they were about her laboratory work, 
Tatro’s posts were expressions of her personal experiences and feelings 
about that work.  Tatro expressed no feelings about the disposition of 
                                                                                                     
 156. See, e.g., 19 AM. JUR. 2D. Proof of Facts § 5.5 (1979) (citing Tatro II for the 
proposition that “allow[ing] student to continue in program while assigning her a failing 
grade . . . was not arbitrary or a pretext for punishing student’s First Amendment rights. . . 
.”).  Perhaps even more troubling are references to Tatro II in the employment law context.  
See RICHARD A. ROSS, 5A MINN. PRAC., METHODS OF PRACTICE § 4.50.10(B) (4th ed.) 
(“While not an employment law case, Tatro [II] is indicative of claims a public employer 
may face if they choose to discipline an employee for statements made on Facebook.”); see 
also Eric Goldman, From Eric’s Blog, 17 No. 7 CYBERSPACE LAWYER 17 (2012) (citing 
Tatro II to illustrate “problems with online discussions by people in the healthcare industry 
literally from cradle . . . to grave”); but see 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 489 
(citing Tatro II for the proposition that “[a] university cannot use a code of ethics as a 
pretext for punishing a student’s protected speech”—presumably relying on the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s decision that applying the code of ethics was justified by Tatro’s status as a 
professional student) (emphasis added). 
 157. See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 873 (11th Cir. 2011) (describing 
memo from administrators detailing various “interactions with [Keeton] during classes, 
papers written . . . for classes, and behaviors toward and comments to fellow students in 
. . . classes); see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 731 (describing various communications 
between Ward and her faculty supervisor on the subject of her clinical work). 
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human remains, her willingness to practice her trade within the bounds of 
professional guidelines, or details that could identify the donor of the 
specimen upon which she worked.  
2.  The Disposition of Tatro II Is Inconsistent with its Holding 
Noting that the universe of “legitimate pedagogical concerns” was so 
broad as to capture “values like ‘discipline, courtesy, and respect for 
authority,’” the Tatro II court explicitly rejected the pedagogical rational 
basis standard of Hazelwood and its progeny as a test for assessing college 
student Facebook posts.158  The court did not explicate in great detail the 
reasons it found such values inappropriate to the facts or context in Tatro.  
Arguably, however, the value protected by the professional conduct 
standard at issue was similar in scope and character to those values the 
court saw as too broad in Hazelwood.  The court concluded that “dignity 
and respect for the human cadaver constitutes an established professional 
conduct standard for mortuary science professionals”159 and that Tatro’s 
Facebook posts were a violation of that standard.  In another case involving 
the posting to a student’s Facebook page of material deemed objectionable 
under a professional conduct standard, a Kansas District Court remarked 
that “students in publicly supported schools [should] not be held to vague 
standards that are interpreted in arbitrary and unpredictable ways that 
ultimately hinge on the personal interpretations, feelings, and personal 
morals of those who are imposing them.”160  While it may be obvious that 
Facebook posts comparing a cadaver to the title character of Weekend at 
Bernie’s are disrespectful, the issue of whether or not “disrespect” is a 
validly quantifiable pedagogical benchmark seems equally subject to 
unpredictable interpretation. 
Furthermore, while the court saw fit to point out that Tatro was well 
aware of the restrictions that her participation in the course would place on 
her online social media posts, it also stated in a footnote that this reasoning 
should not be taken to mean that a student can “contract out” of First 
Amendment Protections: 
                                                                                                     
 158. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d at 518 (quoting Polling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 159. Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 522 (Minn. 2012). 
 160. Byrnes v.  Johnson Cnty. Cmty. Coll., No. 10 2690, 2011 WL 166715 (Jan. 19, 
2011). 
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[o]ur analysis of Tatro’s free speech argument does not depend on 
Tatro’s agreement to restrict her speech as a condition of participating in 
the laboratory courses.  We concur with Tatro that a university cannot 
impose a course requirement that forces a student to agree to otherwise 
invalid restrictions on her free speech.161 
The exact meaning of the distinction is not made explicit, but it would 
seem to follow that “academic program rules, narrowly tailored and directly 
related to established professional conduct standards” would have applied 
to Tatro whether she agreed to them or not.162 
3.  Tatro’s Posts Problematize the Distinctions of Earlier Cases 
Rather than statements of religious or political conviction, Tatro’s 
offending Facebook posts were personal, if arguably off-color.  In past 
cases, however, the Supreme Court has indicated that speech falling into 
some category of artistic expression need not be political in order to gain 
First Amendment protection—indeed, it need not even make sense.163   
The court agreed that the university was free to hold Tatro to 
“academic program rules requiring the respectful treatment of human 
cadavers.”164 Such rules did not violate Tatro’s First Amendment rights 
because they were “directly related to established professional conduct 
standards”165 and “narrowly tailored” inasmuch as they only sanctioned 
public comment.166 Interestingly, the fact that Tatro publicized her own 
Facebook posts to the media only after she believed herself to have been 
suspended from the university—during the police investigation—was a 
factor in the court’s assessment of how widely the posts had been 
disseminated.167 
                                                                                                     
 161. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 521, n.6. 
 162. Id. at 521. 
 163. See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 
557, 569 (1995) (“[A] narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized 
message,’ . . . would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, 
music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 164. Id. at 523. 
 165. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 521–22 (Minn. 2012) (comparing class conduct 
requirements to statutory provisions governing the conduct of mortuary professionals). 
 166. Id. at 523. 
 167. Id. (describing sanctions as narrowly tailored as applied). 
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V.  Potential Ramifications of Tatro II in College Free Speech 
Jurisprudence 
A.  Universities Can Capture Too Much Student Behavior as “Curricular” 
Part of the problem in academic discipline cases is that a university’s 
ability to assign grades to students is characterized, at least in part, as a First 
Amendment freedom.168  University professors cannot be constrained by 
legislatures as to what they may or may not teach, which has created a 
sphere of protection for their curricular decisions about what students must 
read, and how they may appropriately respond.  The doctrine has expanded 
to conclude that professors may even require students to engage in specific 
speech acts that contradict their own beliefs.169   More broadly, universities 
are presumed to have a First Amendment right to determine the content of 
its curriculum.170  Interpolating this right to individual programs or 
departments is not an unreasonable extension of the academic freedom 
doctrine. 
It is unclear whether college students’ adult status and independence 
grants them more or less speech protection than secondary students.  
Colleges are arguably less obviously invested in the moral training of their 
students than high schools are, and college students are more likely to be 
able to benefit from a marketplace of ideas that includes crude and 
unprofessional expressions.  However, the theory that college students 
voluntarily join their educational communities—and thus have a degree of 
notice of behavioral standards to which they will be expected to adhere—
has appeared in the professional standards cases.  This is certainly in 
keeping with the notion that in joining a particular profession—even a 
governmentally-regulated one—citizens can sacrifice certain rights.171 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 522 (citing Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 
2002) for the proposition that a university “has discretion to engage in its own expressive 
activity of prescribing its curriculum”). 
 169. See Axson-Flynn v.  Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1291–92 (10th Cir.  2004) 
(“Requiring an acting student, in the context of a classroom exercise, to speak the words of a 
script as written is no different than requiring that a law or history student argue a position 
with which he disagrees.”). 
 170. See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Curriculum choices are a 
form of school speech, giving schools considerable flexibility in designing courses and 
policies and in enforcing them so long as they amount to reasonable means of furthering 
legitimate educational ends.”). 
 171. See supra Part III.F (describing professional licensing and effect on speech rights). 
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One thing seems certain: the restrictions placed on Tatro’s speech by 
the mortuary science lab’s rules would likely not survive the Supreme 
Court’s usual First Amendment scrutiny.  The fact that “[t]he anatomy lab 
rules allowed ‘respectful but discreet [c]onversational language of cadaver 
dissection outside laboratory’ but prohibited ‘blogging’”172 may be taken as 
a content restriction in time, place, and manner clothing—even in private 
conversations or conversations occurring within the lab itself, the 
governmental “rule” would seem always to prohibit comments that are not 
“respectful.”  Such a statement, “made at any time, in any place, to any 
person” would seemingly have difficulty surviving the strict Constitutional 
scrutiny called for outside the unique Constitutional setting of schools.173 
Due to this confusion, the better rule would be to treat college student 
speech as though it were adult speech.  Students who attended private 
institutions would be afforded the same kind of notice of their lessened 
speech rights that they have of limited due process and religious 
freedoms.174 
B.  Institutional Processes May Create an Imperfect Record for Appellate 
Review 
In all three of the professional standards cases, judicial review 
occurred only after students exhausted internal university grievance 
procedures.175  This has the potential to create two problems—the internal 
processes may create an uncertain record for appellate review, and 
universities may serve first as arbiters of the student’s dispute and later as 
the opposing party when the case is litigated in court. 
Several differences are apparent in the factual summaries of the two 
available Tatro decisions.  In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the number 
                                                                                                     
 172. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012). 
 173. See U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 1537, 2547 (2012) (emphasizing the all-
encompassing nature of the speech prohibited in the Stolen Valor Act for the purposes of 
defining its prohibitions as content-based restrictions triggering strict judicial scrutiny). 
 174. See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lecture, Freedom of Speech at a Private 
Religious University, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 104 (2008) (outlining differences 
in First Amendment rights of public and private universities). 
 175. See Tatro II, 816 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Minn. 2012) (describing initial review of the 
sanctions by the Campus Committee on Student Behavior and affirmation by university 
provost); Ward, 667 F.3d at 731 (describing formal review committee composition and 
process); Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869–70 (describing formulation of student’s “remediation 
plan”). 
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of people to have access to Tatro’s Facebook page is said to be “hundreds” 
of people.176  The Minnesota Supreme Court sets the approximate number 
at “thousands.”177  The Supreme Court opinion also makes no mention of 
the full measure of sanctions leveled by the university and upheld by the 
provost.  While the appeals court’s opinion makes reference to a required 
ethics course, a letter of apology, and a “complete psychiatric 
evaluation,”178 the Supreme Court only reviews the seriousness of a “failing 
grade.”179  If “the seriousness of the consequences” is an important factor 
when assessing a university’s potential suppression of a student’s First 
Amendment expression rights, then the significant difference between these 
two sets of sanctions would seem to be relevant to that analysis.180 
Finally, when initial determinations made against students are subject 
to review by the courts, university officials may not be fair arbiters of 
students’ rights.  As long as a free speech dispute can be captured by the 
court’s deferential curricular decisions jurisprudence, faculty and 
administrators will know that their sanctions are likely to be upheld by the 
courts.  While this may be appropriate in the grade challenge context, when 
the student behavior under review is related to traditional academic issues 
like plagiarism, cheating, or a challenge to an assignment grade, it seems 
considerably less appropriate when it comes to off-campus electronic 
speech that does not affect the student’s completion of course requirements. 
VI.  What Course Should Universities Steer on “Unprofessional” Student 
Speech? 
A.  A Best Practices Approach 
Professionally inappropriate speech acts by students enrolled in 
professional degree programs poses a unique challenge for public colleges 
and universities.  While professors who view themselves as their students 
                                                                                                     
 176. See Tatro I, 800 N.W.2d 811, 815 (Minn. App. 2001) (“Tatro acknowledges that 
[the group of people with access to her Facebook posts] includes hundreds of people.”). 
 177. Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 523. 
 178. Tatro I, 800 N.W. 2d at 815. 
 179. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d at 524 (“. . . Tatro was not expelled or even suspended 
from the Mortuary Science Program.  The University allowed Tatro to continue in 
the . . . program with a failing grade in one laboratory course.”). 
 180. Id. (citing Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2008)). 
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mentors (and administrators who see themselves as guardians of the 
institution’s reputation among members of the fields its professional 
schools train) may instinctively want to shape and correct such lapses, 
higher education institutions are ultimately best suited by an amoral 
approach to student speech acts even when those acts arguably (or even 
clearly) cross the professional line. 
Higher education institutions—even private colleges and 
universities—are beholden to a reputation for openness to controversial and 
sometimes blatantly inappropriate conduct.  While the judicial definition of 
“academic freedom” may be limited to the university’s sovereign power to 
determine what its curriculum means, popular opinion and American 
folkway extend this definition to mean “professors can say what they want 
and not get fired.”181  Students at universities may have the right to feel the 
same way, both as citizens and members of an academic community; often, 
in fact, they are encouraged to feel this way.182  Increasingly (and 
unfortunately), however, they do not—a recent study found that almost 
forty percent of Minnesota college and university students do not feel as 
though they have the right to speak their minds about controversial subjects 
on campus.183   
                                                                                                     
 181. See Lawrence White, Fifty Years of Academic Freedom, 36 J. C. & U. L. 791, 820 
(“[Professors who] invoke academic freedom by virtue of their status . . . collide . . . with 
one of the fundamental precepts of constitutional law: that constitutional rights are not 
profession-specific and membership in a particular profession does not bestow constitutional 
privileges unavailable to citizens at large.”). 
 182. See AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES & ALUMNI, AT A CROSSROADS: PUBLIC HIGHER 
EDUCATION IN MINNESOTA 12, (2010), available at http://www.goacta.org 
/images/download/at_a_crossroads.pdf (citing University of Minnesota Student Conduct 
Code definition of “Academic Freedom” as “the freedom to discuss all relevant matters in 
the classroom . . . and to speak or write without institutional discipline or restraint on matters 
of public concern as well as on matters related to professional duties . . . .”).  The current 
version of the document cited by the American Council of Trustees & Alumni report has 
apparently been updated to remove explicit references to academic freedom, and instead 
states that “[t]he University seeks an environment . . . that is protective of free inquiry. . . . ”  
UNIV. OF MINN. BD. OF REGENTS, STUDENT CONDUCT CODE § I(b), amended Oct. 11, 2012, 
available at http://www1.umn.edu/regents/policies/academic/Student_Conduct_Code.pdf.  
Interestingly, the document also contains the proviso that “[t]he University supports and is 
guided by state and federal law while also setting its own standards of conduct for its 
academic community.” Id. at § I(d). 
 183. See id. at 16 (reporting that 39.1% of Minnesota college and university students 
agreed with the statement “On my campus, there are certain topics or viewpoints that are off-
limits.”). 
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As the Tatro case demonstrates, public colleges and universities have 
little to gain, beyond proof of their own power, from media-fueled street 
fights with students over tasteless Facebook posts, which create the 
impression of a David-versus-Goliath dynamic even when the institutional 
position rests on firm legal ground.184  In addition to the risk that it might 
lose the legal battle—even when that risk is low—institutions must face 
potential public opposition from student groups185 and members of their 
own faculty,186 whose statements to the media on the subject will 
undoubtedly be protected on First Amendment grounds.  Once the matter 
hits the press, any statements made in defense of a disciplined student will 
be protected as speech on matters of public concern—which, if nothing 
else, muddies the rhetorical waters as to the appropriateness of the original 
student speech. 
Another problematic aspect of the student-institutional social media 
relationship evidenced in Tatro II is the lack of a clear social media policy 
addressing hybrid forms such as Facebook.  Amanda’s class syllabus 
forbade “blogging” about cadavers, but made no specific mention of 
Facebook or other personal social media sites—the only reference to 
Facebook occurred during the class’s orientation session.187  While the 
distinction was unimportant to the Minnesota Supreme Court, it is 
incredibly important in the professions, where individuals can (and, 
according to most experts giving good advice, should) manage their social 
                                                                                                     
 184. See, e.g., William Creeley, In Troubling Ruling, Minnesota Court of Appeals 
Upholds Punishment of Student for Facebook Posts, FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN 
EDUCATION, July 12, 2011, available at http://thefire.org/article/13368.html (illustrating 
negative national attention Tatro I drew to the University of Minnesota from a public interest 
group). 
 185. See Editorial, Free Speech Comes First, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.mndaily.com/2012/02/15/free-speech-comes-first (expressing the editorial 
board’s concern that financial motivations might influence the University’s motivation for 
punishing student speech, and asking “[w]hat will happen the next time a student criticizes 
an aspect of University research or wasteful administration that . . . reduces a donor’s 
willingness to give?”). 
 186. See Kaitlin Walker & Katherine Lymn, From Facebook to Court: U Defends 
Discipline, MINN. DAILY, Feb. 13, 2012, available at http://www.mndaily.com/ 
2012/02/13/facebook-court-u-defends-discipline (relaying University of Minnesota media 
law professor Jane Kirtley’s concern that the then-current student conduct code may violate 
the First Amendment). 
 187. See Tatro II, 816 N.W. 2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (“The instructor for the anatomy 
lab course testified that ‘blogging’ was intended to be a broad term and that she explained to 
the students during orientation that blogging included Facebook and Twitter.”). 
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media presence in such a way as to allow for a vibrant, stress-relieving 
private life that does not present the potential for public professional 
embarrassment.  By some accounts, “gallows humor” is not only prevalent 
in mortuary schools, but is recognized by practitioners as a healthy way to 
deal with the pressures of the traditionally somber profession. 
Discussion on the proper role of universities in shaping their students’ 
use of social media abounds.  Often, and unsurprisingly, the focus of such 
“best practices” pieces is the increasing problem of cyber-bullying.188  
Unfortunately, too many of these strategies focus on keeping students from 
doing things that might embarrass their educational patrons.189  If students 
should be aware that their social media posts may put them at odds with 
policies in their academic programs, they need clear notice of these 
policies.190 
Simply put, colleges and universities—especially, but not only, public 
ones—have no proper business managing the private interactions between 
their students and the larger world via non-school-sponsored social media 
applications.  Attempts to do so obscure the institution’s role—at best 
making them out to be enforcers of a moral agenda and at worst Orwellian 
oppressors of student speech.  Often as not, public outcry over a student’s 
sanction is what brings these incidents into the public sphere in the first 
place—not the student’s initial conduct.  When this happens, the 
appropriateness of the student’s original act (or speech act) becomes 
obscured by the appropriateness of the institution’s response—making the 
institution lose, with at least some constituencies, even when it wins, time 
after time, in the courts.  And unlike the courts, which can be forced into 
unpopular decisions by precedent (such as the precedent to give deference 
                                                                                                     
 188. See, e.g., Sara Jane Shanahan & Jessica Gray Kelly, Commentary, How to Protect 
Your Students from Cyberbullying, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER ED., Mar. 25, 2012, available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/How-to-Protect-Your-Students/131306/ (suggesting incorpor-
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 189. See, e.g., Reynol Junco, The Need for Student Social Media Policies, EDUCAUSE 
REVIEW, Jan/Feb 2011 60–61, available at http://net.educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/ 
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 190. See AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES & ALUMNI, supra note 182, at 16 (reporting that 
only 4.9% of Minnesota students disagreed with the statement “Students feel free to state 
their social or political views through social media, such as Facebook or Myspace, without 
getting in trouble on my campus.”). 
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to academic administrative disciplinary boards), colleges and universities 
are free to make their own policy about student social media speech—
including the best policy, to leave it alone. 
B.  Extending Alvarez: A “Stolen Professionalism” Approach 
In 2012, the Supreme Court decided U.S. v. Alvarez,191 invalidating the 
“Stolen Valor” law that made false claims to have earned certain military 
decorations a federal crime.192  The respondent was a member of a 
Claremont, California municipal office who claimed, in numerous public 
meetings, to have been wounded several times in combat and been awarded 
the nation’s highest military honor, the Medal of Honor.193  The Court 
determined that the statute’s broad reach—to encompass “a false statement 
made at any time, in any place, to any person[,]” regardless of the speaker’s 
intent—and lack of any other condition precedent made the law a content-
based restriction on speech, and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny.194  
Moreover, there was no “long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of 
proscription” of false statements on no other basis than their falsity.195  In 
striking down the statute, the Court, per Justice Kennedy, spoke in strong 
terms about the need to protect speech that was not only offensive, but also 
unambiguously false: 
Were the Court to hold that the interest in truthful discourse alone is 
sufficient to sustain a ban on speech, absent any evidence that the 
speech was used to gain a material advantage [i.e., to cause a cognizable 
harm to another], it would give government a broad censorial power 
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.  
The mere potential for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the 
First amendment cannot permit if free speech, thought, and discourse are 
to remain a foundation of our freedom.196 
The Court’s language in search of a compelling governmental interest 
is, given the vastly different context, surprisingly instructive of the 
                                                                                                     
 191. U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (holding that the Stolen Valor Act’s 
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 192. See id. at 2543 (describing the substance of the Stolen Valor Act). 
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 194. Id. at 2547. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 2547–48. 
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professional student speech conundrum.  “Public recognition of valor and 
noble sacrifice by men and women in uniform” the Court wrote, “reinforces 
the pride and national resolve that the military relies upon to fulfill its 
mission.”197  Arguably, a very similar concern animates the public’s interest 
in maintaining the reputation of members of the licensed professions.  If a 
false statement is analogous to a statement that brings potential shame to 
one’s own profession (or, as in Alvarez, a statement that brings shame to a 
profession one does not belong to), then the blanket prohibition of such 
statements may be entitled to similar constitutional protection. 
Even if, for some reason, unprofessional statements are not analogous 
to false ones, imagining statements satisfying both criteria, and that 
nonetheless fit within the Court’s Alvarez analytic framework, is not 
difficult.  What if Tatro had made the following statement, online or off: 
“All mortuary science students at the University of Minnesota are members 
of a Satanic cult”?  Or, “Some mortuary science students at the University 
of Minnesota use their donated cadavers to perform Satanic rituals”?  The 
first of these statements is likely both defamatory and false; the second 
clearly implicates the professional conduct standard—treating the dead with 
respect—that Tatro was found to have violated.  Surely it is more 
damaging, if believed, to the reputation of the mortuary profession than an 
oblique reference to a limp late-eighties comedy.  Yet, because the 
statements are false, they do not indicate actual violation of the code except 
as pure speech.  And the Supreme Court’s analysis in Alvarez suggests that, 
as such, they would be protected but for some professional licensure 
exception to the First Amendment. 
Alvarez provides one other potentially useful analytic tool for use in 
school speech cases: an expressed judicial preference for “counterspeech” 
that will achieve substantially the same goal as prohibition.198  “The remedy 
for speech that is false is speech that is true. . . . The response to the 
unreasoned is the rational; to the uniformed, the enlightened; to the 
straightout lie, the simple truth.”199  Speech out of character with the 
codified standards of the speaker’s profession—as long as that speech does 
not harm the interests of another200—would seem to fit within the Court’s 
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analysis.  As to Tatro, it would be hard to argue that a statement to the 
media about the inappropriateness of her remarks would have corrected 
whatever damage her remarks inflicted on the University’s reputation, 
given the vast degree of community respect enjoyed by the latter.  And, 
before any media correction would have been necessary—Tatro only 
revealed her Facebook posts to the press after she was disciplined by the 
University—the mortuary science program would likely have been able to 
show students why the posts were inappropriate by means of a dialogic 
seminar of some kind.  At the university, Justice Brandeis can be taken 
literally:  “If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and 
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”201  Surely universities, by 
definition the most sophisticated institutions of learning around and the 
intellectual home of our greatest and most persuasive minds, should be the 
last to pass up an opportunity to teach. 
VII.  Conclusion 
If, as Justice Holmes said, “the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”202 then the 
best test of the attitudes of our professionals towards their clients, alive or 
dead, may be the power of those attitudes to withstand public scrutiny.  The 
fact that a student can be punished for expressing an unprofessional attitude 
does not necessarily guarantee the eradication of that thought—especially if 
punishment creates a sense of persecution in the offender, as is often the 
case.203  If anything, Amanda Tatro’s vindication in the press and cause 
celeb status on education rights blogs teaches us this lesson.  That a student 
is a professional student (as opposed to what, we might ask—an 
                                                                                                     
from disclosing confidential information);  R. 1.13(g) (requiring lawyers to inform corporate 
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“academic” or even “real” student) would seem to offer a distinction 
unworthy of a new exception to First Amendment protections.  That 
distinction appears to be hardening, however.  Professors and students—the 
core constituency of the “academy” as we understand it—should be aware 
of what they be signing up for, and what they may be signing away. 
